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The economic theory of federalism is largely built around the premise
that more heterogeneous preferences result in more decentralized
policy making. Despite its prominence and importance, this central
tenet of economic federalism has never been empirically evaluated.
This paper presents the first formal test of the link between preference
heterogeneity and endogenous policy decentralization using as a case
study liquor control in the United States over the period 1934–70.
The results are reassuring: States with more heterogeneous prefer-
ences are more likely to decentralize liquor control and allow for local
government decision making.
I. Introduction
In most countries with federalist constitutions, there is a secular trend
to assign more policy responsibility to the central government. In 1900,
the U.S. federal government controlled about one-third of total gov-
ernment expenditure. Today, this share is larger than 50 percent. Similar
long-term trends can be observed in most federalist countries. More
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recently, however, a significant move toward more decentralized political
systems appears to be emerging (Oates 1999). In the United Kingdom,
the central government shifted some of its power to the new parliament
in Scotland and to the assembly in Wales. In the United States, respon-
sibility for welfare policy has been devolved to individual states. This
trend toward devolution is even more accentuated in developing and
transitional nations (Dillinger 1994).
Economists have long recognized that the case for decentralizing pol-
icy making rests in large part on the heterogeneity of preferences. While
central governments are presumed to provide a uniform level of public
goods and identical regulations for all states,1 decentralized decision
making is better able to tailor policies to local tastes. This is the logic
of Oates’ (1972) famous decentralization theorem, which states that, in
the absence of spillovers, decentralization is welfare superior to cen-
tralized decision making. Most of the economic literature on federalism
builds on this important insight (see, e.g., Inman and Rubinfeld 1997;
Frey and Eichenberger 1999). But is it really the case that preference
heterogeneity leads governments to decentralize policy making? Some-
what surprisingly, the existing literature does not answer this question.
To our knowledge, the central tenet of economic federalism has never
been tested empirically.
In this paper we attempt to close this gap by developing and testing
a positive theory of decentralization in a federalist system. Our focus is
the assignment of regulatory responsibility to the various levels of gov-
ernment in a federal hierarchy. The application considered here is liq-
uor control in the United States. In particular, we are concerned with
the legality of package sales of liquor.2 Following the lifting of prohi-
bition in December 1933, individual states became responsible for reg-
ulating the sale of distilled spirits. Certain states decentralized liquor
policy by permitting local governments to control the legality of liquor,
whereas others chose a centralized, uniform policy for all localities. The
objective of our paper is to explain this choice of decentralization or
centralization.
We begin by modeling a state legislature’s choice of centralizing or
decentralizing liquor control. The model allows legislators who oppose
the centralized policy to buy votes in favor of decentralization. The
theoretical prediction is that decentralization will occur when the mi-
nority’s distaste for the centralized policy is sufficiently strong. In order
to test this theory of endogenous decentralization, information on local
tastes is needed. Using a unique panel data set of local liquor policies
1 Besley and Coate (1999) study a model in which the central government can provide
districts with different levels of local public goods.
2 The package sale of liquor in stores is legally distinct from sales by the drink in
restaurants and bars.
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for the period 1934–70, we produce estimates of such local tastes for
all counties in the United States.3 We use these tastes to calculate a
preference heterogeneity measure for each state and to test the theo-
retical predictions. The empirical estimates suggest that more hetero-
geneous states are more likely to decentralize liquor control. The logic
underlying the decentralization theorem seems to drive actual policy
choices.
By linking preferences to policy making, the paper also highlights the
endogeneity of government institutions and policies. Taking explicit
account of policy endogeneity can have strong implications for applied
microeconomic research (Angeles, Guilkey, and Mroz 1998). For ex-
ample, the literature that studies the efficacy of alcohol control policies
makes use of state-level variation in these policies to discern their effect
on drunk driving and motor vehicle fatalities (Chaloupka, Saffer, and
Grossman 1993; Kenkel 1993). These studies typically treat the state-
level policies as exogenous. But the unobserved taste for liquor influ-
ences both control policies and the number of fatalities, so the resulting
estimates are likely to overestimate the efficacy of the policy instruments
(Brown, Jewell, and Richer 1996). Some studies have sought to eliminate
such bias by including a number of variables that are believed to be
proxies for tastes. Ruhm (1996) has criticized this rather ad hoc ap-
proach and suggested the use of state fixed effects. While fixed effects
(and differences-in-differences estimation) partially control for unob-
served heterogeneity in tastes, Besley and Case (1994) show that these
techniques completely eliminate bias only if the variables that drive
policy are time invariant. As this paper will document, liquor tastes
evolve over time. Thus a measure of tastes that captures such changes
is a useful addition to fixed effects. Including tastes is one way of con-
trolling for relative taste changes between observational units. In an
application at the end of this paper, we show that this point is empirically
relevant by documenting a negative bias in the estimated price elasticity
of liquor consumption when taste dynamics are ignored.
State liquor control is a suitable case study for suggesting general
models of endogenous policies because it provides the rare opportunity
to study both the origin and the evolution of an institution, the choice
of centralized or decentralized liquor control.
3 Our econometric strategy is based on the presumption that the unobserved local tastes
determine local liquor policies, which are set in local elections in decentralized states.
Linking the local liquor policies to exogenous local characteristics such as demographics
and religious affiliation allows us to estimate local tastes for all counties.
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II. Historical Background
By the time Congress initiated repeal of the Prohibition Act in 1933, it
had become apparent that the federal public policy toward liquor had
failed miserably (Kyvig 1979). A majority of the public perceived national
prohibition as futile and promoting organized crime (Gebhart 1932).
In 1930, half of all new federal prisoners were jailed on prohibition-
related crimes (Wooddy 1934). The Democratic Party advocated repeal
of prohibition in its 1932 platform. Franklin Roosevelt’s subsequent
victory was widely perceived as a mandate for repeal (Dobyns 1940;
Munger and Schaller 1997).
The repeal of national prohibition, however, did not imply a return
to the laissez-faire policies of earlier times. Antiliquor groups such as
Protestant evangelical denominations and the Social Reform movement
continued to advocate strict liquor control and even prohibition. Many
Protestant churches and smaller, more fundamentalist congregations
believed that liquor consumption was responsible for sinful acts or that
drinking represented a sin in itself. The most vocal prohibition lobby,
the Anti-saloon League, was largely associated with Baptists, Methodists,
and Presbyterians. Lutherans and Catholics, on the other hand, did not
support the league (Odegard 1928).
But even outside these groups with strong convictions regarding the
social cost of drinking, there was a consensus that strict regulation was
needed to prevent the disorderly conduct associated with the prepro-
hibition saloon. Federal legislators sought to achieve this goal by making
states responsible for liquor control. Prior to prohibition, this respon-
sibility had been placed almost exclusively in the hands of local officials.
The resulting myriad of local rules was now to be replaced with state-
level regulation that limited consumption externalities (Harrison and
Laine 1936). Subsequently, all states rewrote their liquor control statutes.
While seven states initially prohibited the sale of package liquor,4 the
remaining states permitted it (see figs. 1–3 for the state liquor control
status). Among the nonprohibition states, 20 (and eventually 34) states
allowed counties and sometimes municipalities or towns to adopt their
own liquor policy. In these states, communities were able to decide in
local option elections if they wanted to permit the package sale of liquor.
From 1934 to 1939, a total of 5,140 such elections took place. Until
1970, typically hundreds of elections were held in every year. Local
option elections led to dramatic changes in the number of people who
could purchase liquor in their home community (see figs. 4–8 for wet
and dry counties).
Right after prohibition, 37.7 percent of the population lived in areas
4 The prohibition states were Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, and Tennessee.
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Fig. 1.—1935 state liquor control status
that prohibited the sale of distilled spirits. By 1940, this share had de-
creased to 18.3 percent. After a slight rise during the World War II
period, the population share of prohibition areas steadily declined to
about 6 percent in 1970. While some of these changes resulted when
states lifted centralized prohibitions, there were also large changes in
decentralized states. For example, between 1940 and 1970 the popu-
lation share of prohibition areas fell from 73.5 percent to 11.0 percent
in North Carolina and increased from 14.6 percent to 39.3 percent in
Arkansas (Distilled Spirits Institute 1970). With this historical infor-
mation as a background, we now develop a theoretical model of policy
decentralization that will allow us to understand the link between citizen
preferences and liquor regulation.
III. A Model of Policy Decentralization
Consider a legislature that has N members, each of whom represents a
local district. The legislature must decide on a particular policy. It first
determines whether to centralize or decentralize policy making. The
centralization decision will be denoted by the variable whereC  {0, 1},
is centralization and is decentralization. With decentral-C p 1 C p 0
ized decision making, each local district picks its own policy from a
binary choice set With centralized decision making, theP  {1, 1}.
legislature chooses a uniform policy for all districts from the same set
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Fig. 2.—1940 state liquor control status
P. In our particular application, corresponds to legalizing theP p 1
package sale of liquor (“wet”) and corresponds to prohibitingP p 1
the sale of liquor (“dry”).
Let represent the policy preference of the decisive votert  (, )i
in member i’s district.5 With the decisive voter is wet, which impliest ≥ 0,i
that the district will choose to legalize liquor under decentralization. If
the district will be dry under decentralization. Member i’s utilityt ! 0,i
depends on the liquor policy Pi that is effective in his district and on
the legislature’s choice of centralization or decentralization. We write
his utility as
U(P, C) p Pt  Cb. (1)i i
The first term in (1) indicates that member i is rewarded when the
policy in his district conforms to the preferences of the decisive voter.
The member’s reward increases when his decisive voter feels more
strongly about liquor. Conversely, member i’s utility is reduced if the
policy in his district conflicts with the interests of the decisive voter. The
second term in (1) indicates that centralized decision making gives each
member a relative benefit compared to decentralization. We thinkb 1 0
of the benefits of centralization as the interest group contributions that
the member will receive only when the policy is determined at the
5 If local policies are set by majority rule, the median voter would be decisive.
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Fig. 3.—1970 state liquor control status
central level. Under decentralization, interest groups will devote their
resources to local districts in which liquor policy is actually set. Under
centralization, the legislators will receive these contributions because
they set liquor policy (for evidence, see Hoover [1999]).6
All members are allowed to sell their votes to any other member. The
resulting transfer payments can be thought of as actual cash payments
(“bribes”) or vote trades, which are beneficial to the recipient and costly
to the donor. A member will sell or buy votes only if this does not
diminish his utility. We shall ignore time consistency issues and presume
that the vote sales are enforceable. Given our assumptions, policy mak-
ing will be decentralized if the tastes of the decisive voters in the minority
districts are sufficiently extreme. This result is summarized in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition. Let the set of members with be denoted as W (fort ≥ 0i
wet) and the set with denoted as D (for dry). (a) Whent ! 0i
the legislature picks (b) When1N min [ Ft F,  t ] ≥ b/2, C p 0.iD iWi i
the legislature picks When1N min [ Ft F,  t ] ! b/2, C p 1.iD iWi i
the legislature selects ; otherwise it selects t ≥ 0, P p 1 P p 0.i i
6 It is of course possible to think of other benefits of centralization such as a reduction
of negative externalities or returns to scale in decision making or law enforcement.
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Fig. 4.—Wet and dry counties in 1935
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Fig. 5.—Wet and dry counties in 1940
10
Fig. 6.—Wet and dry counties in 1950
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Fig. 7.—Wet and dry counties in 1960
Fig. 8.—Wet and dry counties in 1970
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Proof. See the Appendix.7
The first result states that the choice between centralization ( )C p 1
and decentralization ( ) is determined by the relative size of theC p 0
centralization benefit and by the tastes of decisive voters from minority
districts (the wets in a predominantly dry state and vice versa). The
intuition for this result is straightforward. Decentralization has both
costs and benefits. The cost is that all members in the legislature lose
the centralization benefit, which amounts to Nb. The benefit of decen-
tralization is the ability of minority districts to avoid an unfavorable
policy outcome. Each minority member’s utility increases by if his2Pti i
district is allowed to choose its preferred policy outcome. The more
extreme the minority preferences, the larger their gain from decen-
tralized policy making. Result a in the proposition simply states that
decentralization will occur if the total benefits for minority members,
exceed the cost to the legislature, Nb. It mightmin [ F2t F,  2t ],iD iWi i
be surprising that the tastes of the majority do not appear in the con-
dition for decentralization. To see why, note that members from majority
districts get their preferred policy outcome under either centralization
or decentralization. Thus, with decentralization, majority members have
to be compensated only for the loss of b and not for a less preferred
policy outcome.
The second result states that if centralization is selected, the choice
between the two policy outcomes and is determined byP p 1 P p 1
the mean taste of all decisive voters, When this sum is positive, the t .i i
members supporting can always gain majority support forP p 1 P p
using a suitably large transfer. Notice that numerical majorities are1
irrelevant to both of these decisions. With vote trading, members whose
decisive voter has strong preferences will pay a large transfer to ensure
that his preferred policy is selected.
Three aspects of this model deserve closer attention. First, it is im-
portant for our result that the decisive voters care only about outcomes
and not about legislative processes or a legislator’s intentions. A wet
voter does not care if he has access to liquor as a result of a centralized
wet policy or a local law that permits him to drink. Access to liquor in
his district is all that he cares about. Similarly, we assume that the voter
will punish his representative for not being able to purchase liquor even
if the legislator voted against a centralized dry law. It is the legislative
outcome that matters, not the intentions of the legislator.
Second, our model disregards strategic interaction between districts.
One could argue that the cost of legalizing liquor, such as the exter-
7 We adopt the convention that is selected in result a whenC p 0
and that is selected in result b when1N min [ Ft F,  t ] p b/2 C p 1, P p 1iD iWi i t p 0.i i
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nalities of drunk driving on local roads, may be influenced by the pol-
icies of nearby districts. Unfortunately, almost all game-theoretic models
of strategic interaction will exhibit multiple equilibria and so do not
have sharp empirical implications.8 For this reason, we neglect issues of
strategic interaction at this stage. However, we shall carefully control
for strategic interaction between the districts in our empirical work (see
Sec. IVB).
Third, our model ignores the possibility of “moral externalities.” It is
conceivable that dry voters prefer to ban sales in all districts because
they oppose drinking for moral reasons. These voters may oppose de-
centralization because they are worse off if other individuals drink. Sim-
ilarly, wet voters may be opposed to restricting the sale of liquor in any
district if they feel that such restrictions impair the way of life that is
typical for members of their group. While we acknowledge such pos-
sibilities, they do not change our basic reasoning that a necessary con-
dition for decentralization is preference heterogeneity.
IV. Empirical Specification and Econometric Issues
A. Empirical Specification
The model in the previous section suggests that we shall observe de-
centralization if the tastes of minority decisive voters are extreme
enough so that their representatives in the legislature are willing to
“buy” decentralization. Alternatively, if policy making is centralized, liq-
uor will be legalized if this is beneficial to the mean decisive voter. To
test the theory, we need information on tastes for liquor of the decisive
voter in every district. These tastes are unobserved, but for all decen-
tralized states we know which districts permit the sale of liquor and
which ones do not. Observing local liquor policy is useful because it
conveys some information about the tastes of the decisive voter. Namely,
where liquor is legal, his tastes satisfy Where it is prohibited, wet ≥ 0.i
have It is worth stressing that, for the purposes of testing ourt ! 0.i
theory, the decisive voter’s taste is a sufficient statistic for a local district’s
taste distribution. That is, within-district taste heterogeneity plays no role
in our model, and we shall not estimate distributions of local tastes.
Our empirical strategy then proceeds in two steps. At the first stage,
we estimate the tastes of the decisive voter in each district i. We assume
8 To see this, assume that policies are strategic complements (the net advantage of policy
is increased if a neighbor uses that policy) and that there are two districts whoseP p 1
decisive voters have moderate preferences. There will typically be three equilibria in this
case: both districts select both districts select and both districts mix overP p 1, P p 1,i i
the two policies.
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that these tastes are determined by a linear combination of some ob-
servable characteristics Xi and an unobserved component ui:
t p X b  u . (2)i i i
Since liquor sales are legalized in a decentralized district i when t ≥ 0i
and prohibited otherwise, b may be estimated from decentralized dis-
tricts using a probit (presuming that the unobserved ui has a standard
normal distribution). The parameter estimates have the usual interpre-
tation. For example, we shall be able to determine the increased prob-
ability of having a wet policy if a district’s population share of Catholics
grows by 10 percent.
While equation (2) is estimated using only decentralized districts, the
resulting can be used to fit the expected taste, for allˆ ˆb E(t ) p X b,i i
districts because the Xi are always observed. That is, knowing how the
population share of Catholics and other observed covariates relates to
the likelihood of adopting a wet policy, we are able to simulate what
districts in centralized states would have done had they been granted
the right to choose their own liquor policy.
Once we have estimates of tastes for all the districts, we proceed to
test the theory. Is it the case that more heterogeneous preferences lead
to policy decentralization? We presume that the decentralization deci-
sion in state S is based on the factors discussed in the theoretical model
and on an unobserved component e1S:
∗ 1D p a b  a N min FE(t )F, FE(t )F S 1 S 2 S i i[ ]
iD iWS S
 a I E(t ) 1 0  e . (3)3 i 1S( )
iS
A state will select decentralization ( ) if The theoretical∗C p 0 D ≥ 0.S S
model has predictions about the signs of the parameters a. When the
benefits bS of centralized decision making are larger, decentralization
should be less likely. Hence we expect The expressiona ! 0.1
is a measure of the minority members’1N min [ FE(t )F,  FE(t )F]iD iWS SS i i
willingness to pay for decentralization. It is greater if the minority’s
tastes are more extreme. Thus the theory predicts The expressiona 1 0.2
is an indicator function denoting a state’s mean taste.I( E(t ) 1 0)iS i
If the theory is correct, the mean taste will not influence the decen-
tralization decision, a p 0.3
Given that the legislature decides to adopt a centralized policy
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( or ), the attractiveness of a uniform wet policy is based∗C p 1 D ! 0S S
on the factors in the model and an unobserved component e2S:
∗ 1P F(C p 1) p l b  l N min FE(t )F, FE(t )F S S 1 S 2 S i i[ ]
iD iWS S
 l I E(t ) 1 0  e . (4)3 i 2S( )
iS
A centralized state will have a wet policy ( ) if Under our∗P p 1 P ≥ 0.S S
theory, this decision will be determined by a state’s mean taste. Thus
we expect In contrast, the size of the centralization benefit andl 1 0.3
the willingness of the minority to buy decentralization will not matter:
l1, We shall estimate (3) and (4) as a sequence of probits usingl p 0.2
state data. This requires that the unobserved components e1S and e2S
have independent standard normal distributions.
B. Econometric Issues
There are three econometric issues with our approach: (i) the role of
strategic interaction between districts and the spatial correlation of er-
rors, (ii) the possibility of sample selection in our first-stage procedure,
and (iii) the appropriate standard errors for our generated regressors
in the second stage. We shall address each of these topics in turn.
i. As mentioned previously, it is possible that neighboring districts in
decentralized states influence each other’s liquor policy. In this case,
liquor policies are determined in a Nash equilibrium of “induced tastes,”
which we assume to be a linear combination of induced and exog-∗t̃ ,i
enous preferences. In matrix form this means that where∗ ∗˜ ˜t p fWt  t,i
W is a neighbor-weighting matrix that accounts for direct interaction
between contiguous districts, f is a parameter ( indicates policiesf 1 0
that are strategic complements and indicates strategic substitutes),f ! 0
and t p Xb  u.
We also consider the possibility that the unobserved component of
local tastes, u (which we have interpreted as an error term), may be
spatially correlated across districts according to where ru p rWu  e,
is a parameter and e is a normally distributed error term. When both
strategic interaction and spatially correlated errors are considered, the
system to be estimated is
∗ 1 1 1t̃ p (I  fW) Xb  (I  fW) (I  rW) e, (5)K K K
where IK is the identity matrix and K is the number of districtsK # K
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in all states.9 A comparison with equation (2) indicates that ignoring
the issues highlighted here will result in biased estimates of b (and thus
biased estimates of tastes). Because of the difficulties of working with
nonindependent dependent variables (see Anselin 1988), we rule out
indirect interaction between neighbors of neighbors and consider a first-
order Taylor series approximation of (5):
∗t̃ ≈ (I  fW)Xb  [I  (f  r)W]e. (6)K K
Expression (6) is quasi-linear in the parameters and (under the pre-
sumption that decentralized district i selects a wet policy if ) can∗t̃ ≥ 0i
be fit to obtain consistent estimates of b, f, and r.10 At the second stage,
when we test for the influence of taste heterogeneity on the likelihood
of decentralization, we suppress the influence of f and r and consider
∗ ˆˆ ˜E(t) p (I  fW)E(t ) { Xb. (7)K
ii. The second econometric issue is sample selection in the first-stage
estimates. Recall that our strategy is to estimate from districts in de-b̂
centralized states. When the number of districts in a decentralized state
is small, the parameter estimates of b generally will be biased (proof
available on request). The intuition is that being in a decentralized state
confers some information about ui, the error term in (2). Because the
theory predicts that decentralized states have minority groups with
strong tastes, we would expect the ti’s for decentralized districts to be
far from zero. This means that the error term in (2) should work in
the same direction as In other words, andX b. E(u FX b 1 0) 1 0i i i
E(u FX b ! 0) ! 0.i i
We correct for this sample selection bias by including state fixed effects
when estimating (2) or its generalization (6). With a large number of
9 A further complication is that a decentralized district may be influenced by a cen-
tralized district, which does not set its own liquor policy. We account for this by including
two separate dummies for bordering a centralized wet state or a centralized dry state in
the list of covariates. Neither of the two border dummies is included in the calculation
of the underlying tastes, E(t), since they do not reflect any exogenous county-level
characteristics.
10 We estimate (6) using a two-step procedure. In the first step we estimate a probit with
covariates X and WX, and the resulting parameter, multiplying the X term, is a con-Fitb ,
sistent estimate of b. In the second step, we estimate a probit with covariates X and (the
scalar) and the resulting parameters are consistent estimates of b and f. We thenFitWXb ,
modify the procedure outlined in Poirier and Ruud (1988) to estimate r and a consistent
estimate of the covariance matrix.
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districts, the bias will be the same for all districts in a particular state.11
Thus including state fixed effects will yield consistent estimates of b.12
When fitting the expected tastes, E(t), we shall use the mean state fixed-
effects parameter for all decentralized states.
iii. The third econometric issue involves the use of generated re-
gressors in the second-stage estimates, (3) and (4). The second-stage
standard errors must be modified because the taste regressors are de-
rived from estimated parameters. Unfortunately, the standard correction
technique (Pagan 1984) cannot be readily modified for our case because
of the nonlinear transformation of the taste distribution. Instead we use
bootstrap standard errors (Efron and Tibshirani 1993). We consider 50
replications from the set of states and, on the basis of the resulting
sample, estimate both the first and second stages.13 The standard de-
viations of the second-stage parameter estimates across the replications
serve as the bootstrap standard errors.
V. Data
We compiled the data for this study from several dozen primary sources
and some rarely used census records. A detailed listing and discussion
of our data sources are contained in Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee
(2000). In this section, we highlight the points that are essential for the
analysis.
For the first-stage estimates of local liquor tastes in (2) or (6), our
sample consists of observations for the roughly 3,100 U.S. counties in
the 48 contiguous states during the period 1934–70 (descriptive statistics
for all variables are presented in table 1).14 In these estimates, our de-
pendent variable is an indicator for whether the county liquor policy is
wet, and this is available on an annual basis. We consider several county-
level variables, X, which may influence the taste for liquor. The historical
literature on the subject leads us to expect that religious affiliation will
11 The sample selection bias does vary across districts in a state because each district has
a different expected taste, and hence a different probability of being in the minorityX b,i
group. Another difference is the extent to which a district is “pivotal” in the decentrali-
zation decision, a status that is influenced by the distribution of tastes in the remaining
districts. Because this distribution varies across districts (since the district in question is
excluded), the pivotal status may vary across districts. These differences disappear as the
number of districts in the state grows large.
12 It is crucial that there are a large number of districts per state since fixed effects (as
well as the structural parameters) are inconsistent in discrete response models when there
are a finite number of observations per unit. The magnitude of this bias in probits is
typically less than 10 percent when there are eight observations per unit (see Hsiao 1986).
13 The reason we sample from states is that the standard errors for which we are trying
to obtain appropriate estimates occur in the second stage, where states are the unit of
observation.
14 We exclude counties in Alaska and Hawaii from the sample since they did not become
states until 1959.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Standard
Deviation Maximum Minimum
Proportion wet governments in decentral-
ized states .628 .447 1.000 .000
Population (#105) .505 1.799 70.365 .000
%Urban population 28.019 27.779 100.000 .000
Population density (#103 per square
mile) .194 1.895 89.096 .000
Land area (#103 square miles) .960 1.311 20.175 .001
%Male 50.602 2.163 82.200 37.600
Black 10.215 16.897 85.829 .000
%Population ≥21 years old 58.758 5.608 82.692 38.811
%Married 65.908 4.742 81.294 29.288
Median income (#103 1970 $) 5.568 2.263 18.333 .758
Average wage income (#103 1970 $) 3.539 1.338 23.121 .258
%High school (or more) 31.541 14.111 88.200 .000
%College (or more) 5.036 3.191 38.600 .000
%Unemployed 5.457 4.031 47.949 .000
Median home value (#103 1970 $) 8.036 4.343 58.720 .000
%Renter 42.676 13.715 100.000 .000
%Adventist .151 .407 9.136 .000
%Baptist 12.875 15.684 222.630 .000
%Calvinist 3.331 3.720 66.131 .000
%Catholic 11.007 14.999 209.930 .000
%Episcopalian .937 1.823 39.635 .000
%Evangelical .732 1.316 20.451 .000
%Fundamentalist 2.091 3.337 43.975 .000
%Jewish .252 1.566 58.604 .000
%Lutheran 4.996 9.709 87.750 .000
%Mennonite .091 .749 18.942 .000
%Methodist 8.287 6.187 69.266 .000
%Mormon 1.596 9.788 141.620 .000
%Pentecostal .628 1.829 26.064 .000
%Unitarian .029 .215 11.012 .000
Proportion decentralized (states) .680 .467 1.000 .000
Liquor interest group (#103) (states) 1.473 1.174 7.244 .125
Centralization ratio (states) .794 .296 1.793 .277
Number governments / population
(#103) (states) .507 .570 3.709 .080
Poole-Rosenthal score (states) .090 .286 .735 .598
Motor vehicles per capita (states) .366 .146 .743 .091
Note.—Sample: All counties in the 48 contiguous United States for the period 1934–70 (certain variables are at the
state level). There are approximately 3,100 such counties, though several mergers occur during the sample. Religious
groups exceeding 100 percent of the population occur fewer than 10 times in the sample and were double-checked
with original hard copies of the data.
be important. Because the data include several small but closely related
denominations, we aggregated the religions into 14 groups on the basis
of their attitudes toward alcohol listed in Gründler (1961). Besides re-
ligious affiliation, we consider various demographic variables that are
based on census records (see the listing in table 1). The religion variables
are available for three years over our sample period, and all the dem-
ographic variables are available on a decennial frequency.
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These county-level variables need to be exogenous in the sense that
they reflect voter attitudes toward liquor policy but will not themselves
be influenced by the liquor policy selected. We conducted several formal
tests and can reasonably assume that our variables are exogenous.15
Finally, our first-stage model includes the neighbor-weighting matrix,
W, which we use to control for strategic interaction and spatial corre-
lation (see Sec. IVB). Elements of this matrix are one for land-contig-
uous and decentralized counties and zero otherwise. We then normalize
each row by the number of nonzero elements.
Our second-stage estimates, (3) and (4), are based on state-level data.
The dependent variables—whether liquor policy is decentralized in the
first set of models and whether a centralized state chooses a wet policy
in the second set—are available on an annual basis. We use various
proxies of the benefit of centralization, b. Our preferred measure is the
potential strength of liquor retail interests. State legislators may prefer
centralization because this allows them to capture contributions from
these groups (Smith 1982; Toma 1988). We expect liquor retail interests
to influence policy more strongly if these businesses are more profitable
and if the industry is more concentrated (Olson 1965). We use the profit
retention rate (i.e., one minus the state-level corporate income tax rate)
as a proxy for industry profits. As for our measure of industry concen-
tration, it is not possible to directly use the number of liquor establish-
ments in a state because this number is endogenously determined. We
use the degree of urbanization as an instrument for the number of
liquor establishments. The potential strength of liquor interests is then
measured as the profit retention rate divided by the instrumented value
for the number of retail liquor businesses. Our alternative measures of
b reflect differences in citizen preferences toward centralization. We
consider two centralization ratios: state to local government spending
and the per capita number of governments in the state. Both measures
may reflect tastes toward centralization and implicitly the relative efficacy
of the state government. We also use the mean of the house members’
Poole-Rosenthal D-NOMINATE scores as a more general measure of
ideology (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). The final proxy reflects the neg-
15 County characteristics cannot be considered exogenous if local liquor policies influ-
ence them. For example, if Catholics (who like to drink) move to areas that they expect
to be wet in the future, the variable %Catholic would be endogenous. We conduct two
formal tests to analyze whether this type of migration presents a problem. The first test
checks whether local liquor policy can explain changes in population characteristics be-
tween the end of prohibition and various years in our sample. In the second test, we
investigate whether changes in population characteristics during our study period are due
to changes in local liquor policy. Both tests find significant effects in fewer than 20 percent
of all cases. In addition, many of the significant parameters have the “wrong” sign; i.e.,
we find significant migration to wet counties for groups that do not like to drink. The
results suggest that the county covariates that we use can reasonably be considered ex-
ogenous to local liquor policies.
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ative externality associated with drunk driving. Our measure is the num-
ber of motor vehicles registered per capita.16 All measures reflect a
preference for centralization, except the number of governments and
the Poole-Rosenthal scores, which indicate a preference against
centralization.
VI. Results
A. County-Level Taste Parameters
The first step is to estimate the relationship between local characteristics
and local liquor policies. On the basis of the discussion in Section IV,
the specification is
∗t̃ p Xb  fWXb  dI(centralized)  FE  q, (8)S
where are the (latent) induced tastes of county decisive voters, X are∗t̃
county characteristics, WX are the characteristics of neighboring coun-
ties, I(centralized) are dummies for bordering a wet or dry centralized
state, FES are state fixed effects, and q is an error related to the unob-
served component of tastes. Under the presumption that decentralized
county i selects a wet policy if (8) is estimated on the basis of∗t̃ ≥ 0,i
the observed liquor policies in decentralized counties using a two-step
procedure (see n. 10).17
The resulting parameter estimates are presented in table 2. In the
interest of flexibility, we make separate estimates for the years 1935,
1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970. Most parameter estimates have a straight-
forward interpretation. For example, Baptists, Calvinists (which include
Presbyterians), and Methodists have significant negative parameters
(meaning they are associated with local prohibition), whereas Catholics,
Episcopalians, and Lutherans have significant positive parameters
(meaning they are associated with legalizing liquor). These results are
consistent with the historical literature: the first three religions sup-
16 Note that the number of cars may also proxy for income and for the degree of
urbanization.
17 One complication involves the presence of subcounty liquor policies: In some decen-
tralized states, municipalities within a county are allowed to regulate liquor. We cannot
use municipalities as the unit of observation because our covariates are unavailable at the
municipal level during our sample. Instead, we presume that each municipality has the
same covariate characteristics as its county and that each municipality taste equation has
its own independent error term. Under these assumptions, only three modifications are
needed to form the likelihood function for (8): (i) each county appears Ni times, where
Ni is the number of governments selecting a liquor policy in county i; (ii) for each county,
the dependent variables are one for Pi observations and zero for the remaining ( )N  Pi i
observations, where Pi is the number of wet governments in county i; and (iii) the right-
hand-side variables are normalized using weights Full details and a proof of our0.5N .i
approach are available on request.
TABLE 2
Estimation of County Liquor Tastes
Dependent Variable: County Permits Package Sale of Liquor (Indicator)
1935
(Np1,752)
1940
(Np2,084)
1950
(Np1,788)
1960
(Np1,777)
1970
(Np2,322)
%Adventist 1.538
(.40)
1.022
(.38)
.172
(.20)
.121
(.18)
.181
(.10)
%Baptist .060
(.01)
.040
(.01)
.032
(.01)
.023
(.01)
.013
(.00)
%Calvinist .059
(.02)
.067
(.02)
.095
(.02)
.074
(.02)
.016
(.01)
%Catholic .077
(.01)
.096
(.01)
.082
(.01)
.102
(.01)
.080
(.00)
%Episcopalian .265
(.05)
.196
(.04)
.659
(.06)
.890
(.07)
.666
(.05)
%Evangelical 1.001
(.22)
.854
(.19)
.006
(.07)
.021
(.04)
.034
(.02)
%Fundamentalist .014
(.02)
.015
(.02)
.003
(.01)
.070
(.02)
.037
(.02)
%Jewish .079
(.04)
.066
(.04)
.345
(.11)
.221
(.11)
.106
(.07)
%Lutheran .029
(.01)
.034
(.01)
.045
(.01)
.088
(.01)
.041
(.01)
%Mennonite .367
(.26)
.051
(.08)
.007
(.10)
.065
(.06)
.045
(.03)
%Methodist .111
(.01)
.081
(.01)
.040
(.01)
.023
(.01)
.020
(.01)
%Pentecostal 1.035
(.74)
.589
(.41)
.200
(.14)
.099
(.03)
.025
(.01)
%Unitarian .021
(.39)
.272
(.38)
.021
(.13)
.406
(.20)
.950
(.37)
Population .276
(.10)
.301
(.09)
.314
(.19)
.524
(.15)
.365
(.05)
%Urban
population
.024
(.00)
.027
(.00)
.002
(.00)
.003
(.00)
.002
(.00)
Population
density
.214
(.04)
.178
(.03)
1.774
(.26)
2.134
(.24)
.194
(.04)
Land area .547
(.12)
.359
(.10)
.478
(.10)
.014
(.10)
.290
(.09)
%Male .322
(.06)
.317
(.04)
.028
(.04)
.088
(.04)
.114
(.03)
%Black .046
(.01)
.044
(.00)
.037
(.00)
.050
(.01)
.039
(.01)
%Population
≥21 years old
.114
(.02)
.081
(.02)
.126
(.02)
.017
(.02)
.032
(.01)
%Married .008
(.02)
… .033
(.02)
.004
(.02)
.035
(.02)
Median income … … .813
(.09)
.973
(.08)
.372
(.06)
%High school .030
(.02)
.036
(.02)
.027
(.01)
.004
(.01)
.057
(.01)
%College .098
(.07)
.071
(.06)
.252
(.04)
.153
(.04)
.204
(.02)
%Unemployed .014
(.02)
.020
(.01)
.196
(.03)
.056
(.02)
.053
(.03)
Median home
value
.091
(.04)
.098
(.03)
.020
(.03)
.071
(.03)
.063
(.02)
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TABLE 2
(Continued)
1935
(Np1,752)
1940
(Np2,084)
1950
(Np1,788)
1960
(Np1,777)
1970
(Np2,322)
%Renter .054
(.01)
.028
(.01)
.051
(.01)
.106
(.01)
.078
(.01)
I(centralized wet
border)
.102
(.16)
.014
(.14)
.741
(.15)
.524
(.14)
.564
(.12)
I(centralized dry
border)
.078
(.18)
.438
(.21)
.083
(.21)
.580
(.35)
…
f .554
(.05)
.468
(.05)
.358
(.04)
.304
(.04)
.574
(.05)
r .074 .082 .088 .024 .150
State fixed
effects? yes yes yes yes yes
Mean proportion
wet
governments .76 .67 .58 .58 .64
Log likelihood 6,584.22 8,395.03 7,429.53 7,187.76 9,082.50
Note.—Sample: Counties in decentralized states. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the parameter
estimates. Estimation techniques are explained in Sec. IVB. Interpolations were used for 1935 census variables (except
%married [1930 data are used], %high school [1940 data are used], and %college [1940 data are used]) and 1960
religion variables. Unavailable explanatory variables are %married (1940) and median income (1930 and 1940). No
I(centralized dry border) parameter is estimated in 1970 because there are no centralized dry states in that year. See
n. 17 for the treatment of subcounty policies.
ported the liquor prohibition movement and the latter three groups
opposed it. Our findings also conform to earlier empirical work. Toma
(1988) in her study on liquor licenses, Goff and Anderson (1994) in a
paper on senatorial support for repeal, and Hersch and Netter (1989)
in work on the rate at which states adopted prohibition in the nineteenth
century all find similar effects of religious affiliation.18
Several county characteristics have large effects on the propensity to
be wet. A one-standard-deviation increase in the following variables
changes the probability of being wet by at least 0.15 in all years (when
evaluated at mean values): %Baptist, %Catholic, %Episcopalian, pop-
ulation, population density, land area, %black, median income, and
%renter. For example, in 1935 a one-standard-deviation increase in
%Baptist (%Catholic) changes the probability of being wet by 0.271
(0.446).
18 There is also contemporary evidence linking the characteristics here to individual
preferences. The General Social Survey (1999) contains information on individual dem-
ographics and drinking behavior. Presumably individuals who oppose liquor sales are
unlikely to drink, whereas those who favor liquor sales are likely to at least occasionally
have a drink. Using General Social Survey data over the period 1972–96, we found a
statistically significant relationship between an individual drinking indicator and the fol-
lowing demographic variables: religious affiliation, gender, race, age, marital status, ed-
ucation, and income. In addition, these relationships are in the expected direction; e.g.,
only 56.0 percent of Baptist respondents ( ) said they drink, whereas 84.3 percentN p 3,448
of Catholics ( ) reportedly drink.N p 4,008
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The positive and significant f parameter in table 2 suggests that local
liquor policies are strategic complements. One explanation is that being
surrounded by wet neighbors lowers the cost of being wet, possibly
because it decreases the number of drunk drivers from neighboring
districts. The small r parameter indicates that there are unlikely to be
spatially correlated errors.19
We checked whether the parameter estimates in table 2 are time
varying. After the five years are pooled, it is possible to reject a null of
time-invariant parameters even at the 99 percent confidence level. Some
variables associated with local prohibition—such as Baptists and Meth-
odists—have parameters that become more positive over time.20 This is
consistent with the historical record, which shows that such groups be-
come increasingly tolerant of legalizing liquor over our sample period.
More generally, the parameter variation suggests that liquor tastes evolve
over time, a topic we shall return to later.
To assess the quality of our first-stage estimates, we performed an out-
of-sample prediction. During the period of our study, five states (Ala-
bama, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee) changed from a
centralized to a decentralized policy. The estimated tastes allow us to
predict county liquor policies, which can be compared with the actual
policies that counties in these states chose once they were free to adopt
their preferred liquor status. We correctly predict the county policy in
86.9 percent of all cases ( ). As a comparison, 66.7 percent ofN p 510
these counties actually adopted a dry policy. This reasonably close fit
and the consistency of our findings with both the historical and the
empirical literature suggest that our parameter estimates capture the
most important determinants of local preferences over liquor policy.
B. State Decisions: Testing the Model
We now turn to our main results. Are we able to predict whether states
decentralize liquor control on the basis of the estimated county liquor
tastes? Before we turn to the formal tests, it is useful to consider a
qualitative comparison. Table 3 presents two measures of within-state
taste heterogeneity: the minority group taste measure developed in the
theory section, which expresses the minority members’ willingness to
“buy” decentralization; and the within-state variance of the estimated
county tastes, which is a more general measure of taste heterogeneity.
Decentralized states tend to have higher values of both measures, sug-
gesting that they have greater taste diversity. The contrast between par-
19 There is no available standard error for r, which is estimated using a grid search.
20 It is inappropriate to directly compare parameter values across different samples be-
cause of the variance normalization implicit in the estimation procedure. The interpre-
tations in the text involve parameter values relative to the %black parameter in each year.
TABLE 3
Qualitative Review of Taste Heterogeneity
1935 1940 1950 1960 1970
A. Minority Group Taste Measure,
1N min [S FE(t )F, S FE(t )F]iD i iW i
Alabama .000 .000 .343 .381 .000
California .026 .196 .000 .000 .000
Georgia .000 .000 .378 .180 .021
Idaho .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Illinois .119 .104 .536 .245 .001
Indiana .000 .000 .107 .000 .000
Iowa .000 .000 .038 .000 .000
Kansas .000 .000 .494 .208 .000
Mississippi .000 .000 .615 .119 .000
New Mexico .000 .307 .125 .174 .000
New York .000 .111 .000 .031 .025
Oklahoma .000 .000 .129 .000 .000
Tennessee .000 .000 .109 1.023 .036
Texas .000 .107 .627 .249 .009
Wyoming .000 .014 .000 .000 .000
Decentralized states .004
(.02)
.045
(.11)
.402
(.61)
.294
(.60)
.005
(.01)
Centralized states .001
(.01)
.035
(.07)
.129
(.21)
.008
(.03)
.000
(.00)
All states .003
(.02)
.042
(.10)
.316
(.53)
.205
(.51)
.004
(.01)
B. Within-State Variance of Tastes, Var[E(t)]
Alabama 1.517 1.945 3.408 10.021 4.652
California 5.832 4.834 4.320 2.541 18.365
Georgia 1.530 2.205 3.548 8.890 4.936
Idaho 3.673 2.344 4.363 3.463 1.906
Illinois 10.058 6.634 7.873 19.365 22.318
Indiana 2.653 2.301 2.038 2.818 2.822
Iowa 2.333 2.781 3.895 6.651 3.399
Kansas 2.020 1.610 6.906 13.293 6.206
Mississippi 2.974 2.385 4.251 5.921 4.854
New Mexico 12.583 13.798 13.802 17.351 9.459
New York 8.388 7.965 7.882 27.872 18.479
Oklahoma .940 .941 .870 2.405 1.778
Tennessee 1.642 2.185 3.417 8.680 4.950
Texas 6.839 8.739 9.707 21.406 8.790
Wyoming 9.750 5.308 13.406 9.041 5.002
Decentralized states 5.332
(2.79)
5.239
(3.42)
13.279
(21.23)
28.390
(46.48)
10.437
(5.56)
Centralized states 3.702
(2.69)
3.378
(2.02)
5.446
(4.36)
5.005
(2.21)
5.274
(4.18)
All states 4.721
(2.84)
4.619
(3.13)
10.831
(18.06)
21.082
(39.90)
8.931
(5.67)
Note.—The 15 states listed here are selected to ensure diversity in geography and state policy. In the last three rows
of each panel, the listed value is the mean and the value in parentheses is the standard deviation.
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TABLE 4
Probit Estimation of State Decentralization
Dependent Variable: State Is Decentralized (Indicator)
No b
(1)
Full
(2)
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Taste Measures
1N min[ FE(t )F,iD i FE(t )F]iW i
2.063
(.81)
1.570
(.65)
1.936
(.84)
2.112
(.73)
1.890
(.86)
2.039
(.69)
1.851
(.77)
I( E(t ) 1 0)i i .043
(.15)
.226
(.49)
.226
(.19)
.025
(.13)
.081
(.10)
.056
(.07)
.377
(.31)
B. b Measures
Liquor interest group … .711
(.36)
.651
(.31)
… … … …
Centralization ratio … .624
(.58)
… .566
(.41)
… … …
Number of govern-
ments per
population
… .014
(.39)
… … .277
(.23)
… …
Poole-Rosenthal score … .261
(.78)
… … … .212
(.64)
…
Motor vehicles per
capita
… 1.760
(1.35)
… … … … 1.391
(1.10)
Observations 240 238 240 240 238 240 240
Log likelihood 144.37 131.83 136.07 138.61 140.65 144.24 143.28
Note.—Sample is 48 contiguous states (pooled data for 1935, 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970). Bootstrap standard errors
are in parentheses below the parameter estimates (see Sec. IVB). All specifications also include a constant.
ticular states can be striking. States that always have a centralized policy
(California, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Oklahoma, and Wyoming) seem to
have far less diverse tastes over liquor policy than states that have a
decentralized policy (Illinois, New Mexico, New York, and Texas). In
addition, the five remaining states in table 3, which each adopted a
decentralized policy during the sample period, seem to experience
growth in the various heterogeneity measures prior to adoption (e.g.,
Kansas decentralized liquor policy in 1948). It would be interesting to
see whether heterogeneity jumps immediately before decentralization.
Unfortunately, this is not possible because the local characteristics, and
thus the taste measures, are observed no more than once per decade.
Our formal tests of the model are based on generating annual mea-
sures of each state’s taste distribution from the estimates in table 2 and
then estimating (3) and (4). The first state decision is to decide whether
to decentralize, which we model as a probit in which the dependent
variable is an indicator that is one for decentralized states. The key
findings are presented in table 4, where we pool the values from the
five years in the first stage. The results are consistent with our theoretical
model. The positive and significant parameter on minority tastes (row
1) means that a state is more likely to decentralize when the minority
decisive voters have more extreme tastes. This effect is quite large: In
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TABLE 5
Probit Estimation of State Centralized Policy Choice
Dependent Variable: State Is centralized, Wet (Indicator)
No b
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Taste Measures
I( E(t ) 1 0)i i 1.515
(.46)
1.177
(.49)
1.563
(.40)
1.495
(.33)
1.476
(.39)
1.379
(.79)
1N min [ FE(t )F,iD i FE(t )F]iW i
1.357
(1.31)
2.099
(1.41)
1.589
(1.12)
1.375
(1.19)
1.307
(1.09)
1.563
(1.20)
B. b Measures
Liquor interest
group
… .866
(.54)
… … … …
Centralization ratio … … .818
(.91)
… … …
Number of govern-
ments per
population
… … … .033
(.31)
… …
Poole-Rosenthal
score
… … … … .362
(1.16)
…
Motor vehicles per
capita
… … … … … 6.934
(4.21)
Observations 78 78 78 76 78 78
Log likelihood 27.63 25.16 27.06 27.59 27.55 25.79
Note.—Sample is centralized states (pooled data for 1935, 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970). Bootstrap standard errors
are in parentheses below the parameter estimates (see Sec. IVB). All specifications also include a constant.
the full specification (col. 2), a one-standard-deviation increase in the
minority group’s willingness to “buy” decentralization increases the
probability that a state is decentralized by .556 (evaluated at mean sam-
ple values). Also, as predicted, the mean taste term (row 2) does not
have a significant influence on the decision to decentralize.
Our measures of the relative benefit of centralization b (panel B) are
also generally consistent with the theoretical model. In particular, our
preferred measure, the strength of the liquor interest group (row 3),
is associated with a lower probability of decentralization and is statisti-
cally significant. Notice that omitting our admittedly imperfect b mea-
sures does not diminish the strong positive effect of taste heterogeneity
(col. 1).
The second state decision, which is conditional on centralization, is
to pick a uniform wet or dry policy. Table 5 contains the results of a
probit analysis among centralized states in which the dependent variable
is an indicator that is one for wet states. These results are also consistent
with our model. States in which the mean county is wet (row 1) are
more likely to select a wet policy. As predicted, the minority group’s
willingness to “buy” decentralization (row 2) and the centralization ben-
efit measures (panel B) have insignificant parameters.
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To see whether the results are driven by a single period, we reesti-
mated the specifications in tables 4 and 5 (i) including year dummies
in the pooled sample and (ii) separately for each year. The parameters
on minority tastes and the b proxies maintain their sign and statistical
significance.21 Also, for roughly two-thirds of the specifications, it is not
possible to reject with 95 percent confidence the null that the param-
eters on all the year dummies are identical.22 This is interesting given
that table 3 indicates that liquor tastes vary over time.
C. Robustness Tests
Our results are robust to several alternative approaches. For the first-
stage estimates of local liquor tastes (table 2), we conduct five different
robustness tests. First, we investigate the role of taxes, because it is
possible that counties might adopt a wet policy to collect revenues. In
practice, these incentives are quite small because most states allocate
the lion’s share of tax revenue independently of a county’s liquor status.
Even dry counties typically receive liquor revenue. On average, a county
will gain well under $5.00 per capita in tax revenues from being wet.
More formal evidence also suggests that taxes do not drive policy out-
comes.23 Second, we add country of origin variables to the list of first-
stage covariates (these variables might reflect cultural attitudes toward
liquor policy not captured by the other explanatory variables). For the
available years (1935 and 1940), many country of origin variables have
significant parameters, but our state-level taste variables are quite similar
to those found using our original specification. Third, to more generally
investigate the role of omitted covariates in the first stage, we pool all
years of data and estimate a conditional fixed-effects logit. The same
basic relationship between tastes and state policies in tables 4 and 5
holds when the fixed-effects parameters are used to generate estimated
tastes. Fourth, we reestimate the first stage after excluding the strategic
21 It is difficult to estimate year-by-year specifications for the conditional centralized
policy probits (table 5) because our mean wet taste indicator, perfectlyI( E(t ) 1 0),i i
predicts the dependent variable in 1950 and predicts all but one state in 1935 and 1940.
This is precisely what the theory leads us to expect.
22 In the conditional centralized probits (table 5), it is not possible to estimate a year
dummy for 1970 since no state is centralized dry in that year. It is also typically not possible
to compute the standard error on the 1960 year dummy because only one state has a
centralized dry policy in that year.
23 Liquor taxes cannot be directly included in the first stage because county-level data
are unavailable. Instead we reestimate the first-stage parameters for counties in which
there is virtually no tax benefit of being wet (these counties are in states in which the
“local share” of liquor tax revenues is 5 percent or less). For all years but 1950, it is not
possible to reject the null that the parameters are identical to those from the full sample.
In addition, the state fixed effects in table 2 should account for the incentives any state
tax system imparts on the local policy decision. Finally, the “local share” of liquor taxes
never has a statistically significant effect in a state-level decentralization probit.
endogenous policy decentralization 29
interaction and spatial error correlation terms as well as the centralized
neighbor indicators. This omission does not qualitatively change our
imputed state-level taste variables. Fifth, we restrict the first-stage sample
in 1940–70 to include only counties in states that were decentralized in
1935 to investigate the possible effects of dynamic sample selection. This
does not noticeably change the parameter estimates.
We also consider the robustness of the second-stage state-level esti-
mates (tables 4 and 5) in various ways. First, we reestimate the param-
eters using various subsets of the data: omitting various groups of states
(southern states, western states, decentralized states in 1935, or random
samples of 10 states) and omitting data from 1935. All the taste param-
eters maintain their sign and significance. Similarly, the parameters of
interest do not noticeably change when we estimate second-stage spec-
ifications, which include various control variables (such as the popu-
lation percentage of blacks and urban dwellers) and allow for strategic
interaction between states.
Second, we investigate the possibility that our first-stage taste estimates
are imperfect because of omitted variable bias. This could cause serious
problems for our second-stage parameter estimates because our measure
of heterogeneity is a highly nonlinear function of tastes. Therefore, we
consider an alternative measure of heterogeneity, the within-state vari-
ance of local tastes (see panel B of table 3). This measure yields unbiased
second-stage parameters even when there are omitted first-stage co-
variates (proof available on request). Intuitively, the variance is strongly
separable, so the omitted portion of tastes is simply added to the second-
stage error.24 We reestimate the second-stage specifications in tables 4
and 5 using as our taste measures the within-state variance and the
absolute value of the mean taste. The latter is used because minority
groups are unlikely to be important in states with a strong wet or dry
tilt. In the decentralization probit, the taste variance has a significant,
positive parameter. The absolute value of the mean has the expected
negative sign, though its parameter is typically insignificant. In probits
explaining centralized states’ choice of wet and dry policies, a larger
mean taste (level, not absolute value) increases the propensity to adopt
a wet policy, whereas a higher variance has no statistically significant
effect. All these estimates are consistent with the theoretical model.25
Third, we consider an alternative measure of the state taste distri-
24 There is an additional rationale for considering this variance measure of heterogeneity.
In the theoretical model, tastes are scaled in such a way that indicates a preferencet ≥ 0
for legalizing liquor. As the empirically estimated tastes are derived from a nonlinear
estimation procedure, they need not share this property. In contrast, the variance is rel-
atively insensitive to scaling.
25 We also find similar results when we use the interquartile difference and median of
the state taste distribution as our two summary statistics for local tastes. These variables
have the advantage of not being strongly influenced by outliers.
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bution. It is possible that counties with a larger population have more
representatives in the state legislature and so should receive more weight
in defining the state taste distribution. We therefore weight each
county’s fitted taste value by its relative population share in the state.
As a consequence, our state taste distributions change significantly. How-
ever, none of our second-stage parameters change their sign or
significance.
Fourth, we consider an alternative approach to testing the theoretical
model. Rather than estimating a first stage, we directly use the variance
of county-level characteristics within each state as the preference het-
erogeneity measure. We generate the variance matrix of several variables
likely to be associated with legalizing liquor and the negative of others
likely to be associated with prohibiting liquor. The larger this matrix is
for a given state, the more heterogeneous liquor tastes are.26 We find
that two measures of the size of the variance matrix—the maximum
eigenvalue norm and the sum of all elements—have a positive effect on
the probability that a state is decentralized. This result is also consistent
with the theoretical model.
Finally, we evaluate an alternative theory of policy selection: States
and localities simply revert to their preprohibition policies when pro-
hibition ended. While such a theory could still be taste driven, it would
imply that historical inertia alone can explain liquor policies. To test
this, we compare each state and county’s liquor policy in 1935 with its
policy in 1919, 1915, 1905, and 1890. It is possible to reject a null of
simple reversion at the 95 percent confidence level for all decisions.
VII. Application: Policy Endogeneity Bias
The estimated taste variables can be used to get more precise measures
of the price elasticity of aggregate liquor consumption, an important
input in determining the appropriate liquor tax rate. Most papers in
this literature identify price elasticities from interstate differences in
prices, which in turn are chiefly due to differences in state tax rates
(Grossman et al. 1993). Without a proper taste control, this approach
can lead to a spurious negative correlation between prices and con-
sumption. Strong antiliquor sentiment may lead a state to adopt higher
liquor taxes (and thus prices) and can independently lead to lower
liquor consumption. One approach is to control for these taste differ-
ences through state and period fixed effects (Baltagi and Griffin 1995).
However, by definition, fixed effects cannot capture state-specific dy-
26 The signing convention ensures that if the off-diagonal element (i, j) is large, then
a county with extreme wet tastes on variable i is also likely to have extreme wet tastes on
variable j.
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TABLE 6
Price Elasticity of Liquor Consumption (Np480)
Dependent Variable: ln(State Liquor Consumption per Capita)
Ordinary Least Squares
Two-Stage
Least
Squares
(3)(1) (2)
ln(P) .703 .571 .589
(.19) (.20) (.41)
E(tS) … .049 .051
(.01) (.01)
Controls? yes yes yes
State fixed effects? yes yes yes
Year fixed effects? yes yes yes
R2 .98 .98 .98
Note.—Sample is license states for 1954–70 (monopoly states are excluded). The liquor consumption (in cases) and
pretax price (per gallon) data come from Jobson Associates (various years), and the state plus federal tax (per gallon)
data come from the Distilled Spirits Institute (1940–70). The price and tax terms were converted to real terms using
the whiskey at home consumer price index. The price variable is the weighted price of blend, straight, bond, scotch,
Canadian, gin, rum, brandy, and vodka (the weights are based on the national market shares of these types of liquor).
The control variables are the logarithms of population, real median income, percentage at least 21, %urban, and
%black. The 2SLS estimate instruments for price using the variance of the state taste distribution in addition to the
mean taste and the control variables. Huber/robust/sandwich standard errors are in parentheses below the parameter
estimates.
namics in tastes. A state in which there is growing sentiment for pro-
hibition relative to other states is more likely to increase tax rates and
decrease consumption. We shall explicitly control for state tastes using
the estimates from the previous section. The system to be estimated is
C p d  d P  d E(t )  d Z  e ,S 0 1 S 2 S 3 1S 1S
P p g  g E(t )  g Z  e , (9)S 0 1 S 2 2S 2S
where CS is per capita liquor consumption in state S, PS is the after-tax
liquor price, E(tS) is the mean state preference for legalizing liquor
(estimated in the previous section), Zi are control variables, and ei are
possibly correlated error terms.
The results in table 6 provide support for the arguments in the pre-
vious paragraph. Omitting the mean taste term from the consumption
equation (col. 1) results in a more negative price elasticity than when
it is included (col. 2); this result is robust to two-stage least-squares
(2SLS) estimation, which accounts for correlation between the error
terms in (9) (col. 3). The intuition is that stronger tastes for legalizing
liquor result in higher consumption as well as lower prices,27 so sup-
27 The first-stage estimation in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of price
has a parameter of 0.011 on the mean taste term (the robust t-statistic is 4.21). This
equation includes the control variables listed in the note to table 6 as well as state and
year fixed effects.
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pressing the taste term in the consumption equation biases the price
parameter.28
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper we have traced the endogeneity of liquor control policies
in the United States. We argue that a state’s choice of whether or not
to decentralize liquor control is related to the degree of preference
heterogeneity, and we have found empirical support for this conclusion
using a rich data set over the period 1934–70. The logic underlying the
economic theory of federalism appears to drive actual policy choices.
We have also found that changes in tastes are reflected in changes in
institutions: as pro-prohibition groups adopted a more liberal attitude
toward liquor, states removed centralized prohibition policies. Our
model of endogenous decentralization could be applied to other policy
areas. For example, it would be interesting to investigate to what extent
the devolution of welfare policy in the United States was driven by
increases in preference heterogeneity.
Our results also highlight the importance of explicitly accounting for
policy or institutional endogeneity in empirical work. As our estimates
of the price elasticity of liquor demand show, ignoring policy endoge-
neity will typically result in biased parameter estimates. To control for
such endogeneity, we employ fixed effects and imputed tastes. While
the former control for time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity, the
latter help account for relative preference changes across the observa-
tional units. Policy endogeneity also has broader implications. For ex-
ample, our results suggest that measuring the efficacy of a policy on the
basis of the experience of a few “pioneer” states is inappropriate. Such
states are likely to have a unique set of characteristics that influence
both why they implemented the policy and what their outcome was.
Appendix
Proof of the Proposition
The proof will proceed by first comparing the three possible pairwise votes in
the legislature and then using these results to find the Condorcet winner for
any arbitrary distribution of tastes. First consider the pairwise votes involving
the decentralized outcome, Since members cannot sell their decentral-C p 0.
ized decision, the W members will all have and the D members will allP p 1i
have under decentralization.P p 1i
Lemma 1. (1) When the legislature votes over the centralized policy C p 1,
28 More formally, if the taste term is omitted from the consumption equation in (9),
the error term becomes Even if the error terms are orthogonal, theu { d E(t )  e .S 2 S 1S
price elasticity is biased since Since empirically2Cov (P , u ) p g d E(t ) ( 0. g ! 0, d 1S S 1 2 S 1 2
and the estimated price elasticity will have a negative bias.0, d ! 0,1
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and the decentralized policy it will choose whenP p 1 C p 0, C p 0 Nb 
and otherwise. (2) When the legislature votes over 2Ft F ≥ 0 C p 1, P p 1iD i
the centralized policy and the decentralized policy it willC p 1, P p 1 C p 0,
choose when and otherwise.C p 0 Nb  2t ≥ 0 C p 1, P p 1iW i
We shall focus on the first vote between and (the proofC p 0 C p 1, P p 1
for the other vote is analogous). It will be useful to split the D’s among two
subgroups: denote the members with as MD (for moderate D)t  [b/2, 0)i
and those with as ED (for extreme D). The main distinction betweent ! b/2i
these subgroups is that the MD members prefer to sinceC p 1, P p 1 C p 0
outweighs their relatively weak taste for policy Hence, in the voteb/2 P p 1.
both the W and the MD members will support and the ED membersC p 1, P p 1
prefer First suppose that the W plus MD members have a numericalC p 0.
majority of M members, so the outcome without vote trades is ToC p 1, P p 1.
change this outcome, the ED members must bribe at least members ofL ≥ M
the majority to change their vote (we shall interchangeably refer to L as a set
and the cardinality of that set). To be concrete, say that J MD members and
W members are bribed. The ED members are willing to pay up toL  J
their increase in utility from relative to and (2Ft F  b), C p 0 C p 1, P p 1,iED i
the unbribed MD members will pay a counterbribe up to and (b  2Ft F)iMD\ J i
the unbribed W members will pay a counterbribe up to (to derive biW \(LJ )
the latter value, recall that the W members get their preferred policy P p 1
regardless of the vote outcome). The net change in utility of the L bribed
members from selling their votes is
bribeDU p (2Ft F  b)  b  (2Ft F  b)  L i i[ ] [ ]
iJ iLJ iED
 (b  2Ft F)  b , (A1) i[ ]
iMD/J iW/(LJ )
where the first term in brackets represents the bribees’ loss in utility from getting
their less preferred outcome and the other two brackets represent the maximum
value of the bribe and the forgone counterbribe. A bit of algebra shows that
bribeDU p Nb  2Ft F. (A2)L i
iD
The ED’s will be able to buy the votes for if and only if (A2) is nonnegative.C p 0
Now suppose that the ED members have a numerical majority, and so the out-
come without vote trades is When the MD’s and W’s try to bribe enoughC p 0.
ED’s to change the outcome to similar algebra shows that theC p 1, P p 1,
change in utility of the bribees from selling their vote is bribeDU p Nb L
This means that the condition for decentralization is identical to the 2Ft F.iD i
case in which the ED members are a numerical minority.
The second pairwise vote involves the choice between the two centralized
policies, andC p 1, P p 1 C p 1, P p 1.
Lemma 2. When the legislature votes over the two centralized policy outcomes,
will be chosen when and will be chosenC p 1, P p 1  t ≥ 0 C p 1, P p 1i i
when  t ! 0.i i
To see this result, we shall assume that (the proof for follows t ≥ 0  t ! 0i ii i
from simply interchanging the groups and the outcomes). In this vote, all W
members prefer and the D members prefer AssumeC p 1, P p 1 C p 1, P p 1.
first that the majority of members are W, with M the size of their numerical
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advantage. In the absence of transfers, the outcome is and in thisC p 1, P p 1,
case it is not possible for the D members to generate a large enough transfer
to change the outcome. To see this, suppose that the D’s try to bribe WL ≥ M
members to vote for in order to change the majority rule out-C p 1, P p 1
come. The maximum transfer that the D’s are willing to pay is their 2Ft F,iD i
increase in utility from relative to ; the unbribedC p 1, P p 1 C p 1, P p 1
W’s are willing to offer a counterbribe of The net utility to the L 2t .iW \L i
members from accepting the bribe is
bribeDU p  2t  2Ft F  2t ≤ 0, (A3)  L i i i
iL iD iW/L
where the first term represents the bribees’ loss in utility from getting their less
preferred outcome the second term is the maximum bribe fromC p 1, P p 1,
the D’s, and the third term is the loss of the maximum counterbribe from the
remaining W’s. Since this expression equals which is weakly negative,2 t ,i i
the L members refuse to sell their votes. Suppose instead that the majority of
members are D, with M the size of their numerical advantage. In this case the
W members are willing to pay a bribe of to any set of D members 2t L ≥ MiW i
to vote for and the unbribed D members will pay a counterbribeC p 1, P p 1,
of Because the L bribed D members will lose utility by voting 2Ft F.  2Ft FiD\L iLi i
for their net change in utility from accepting the bribe isC p 1, P p 1,
bribeDU p  2Ft F  2t  2Ft F ≥ 0, (A4)  L i i i
iL iW iD/L
where we have again considered the maximum possible bribes. This shows that
the W members are able to offer a large enough bribe to earn the C p 1,
outcome.P p 1
The final step in the proof is to consider the simultaneous vote over the three
outcomes. We focus on the case in which (the proof for is t ≥ 0  t ! 0i ii i
analogous). Here defeats (from lemma 2). IfC p 1, P p 1 C p 1, P p 1
then also defeats (from lemma 1), andNb  2Ft F ! 0, C p 1, P p 1 C p 0iD i
so it is the Condorcet winner. Alternatively, if thenNb  2Ft F ≥ 0, C p 0iD i
defeats (from lemma 1) and also (sinceC p 1, P p 1 C p 1, P p 1  t ≥iW i
and from lemma 1), and so it is the Condorcet winner. Ft FiD i
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